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Executive summary
The global financial crisis allegedly led to the end of global banking. However, we find 
that reports of the demise of global banking are premature. Among the global systemically im-
portant banks, we find that there has been a shift of business from the global European banks 
to the more domestic Asian banks, which are gradually increasing their global reach. The US 
banks have maintained their strong position. Within Europe, we find a mixed picture. The 
euro-area banks have maintained their global reach, while UK and Swiss banks have experi-
enced a significant decline in their geographic reach.
Overall, we conclude that the decline in cross-border banking is largely a result of a 
composition effect (ie a reshuffling within the global banking champions’ league); it is far less 
a consequence of a reduced global reach of individual banks.
On the reform agenda, an important policy measure has been the increase of capital at 
the large global banks. Overall, we find an almost doubling of the leverage ratio (Tier 1 capital 
divided by total assets) from 3.1 percent in 2007 to 5.9 percent in 2015. This is very welcome. 
However, the euro area, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland trail behind with leverage ratios 
between 4 and 5 percent. We recommend these countries should bring the leverage ratios of 
their largest banks more into line with international practice.
The euro-area banks are in the twilight zone. These banks have reduced in size (about 20 
percent), which was to be expected because of overbanking in Europe, but have maintained 
their geographic reach. Nevertheless, the capitalisation of euro-area banks lags that of their 
Chinese and US peers. While the European Central Bank has made progress on the size and 
consistency of Pillar 2 capital requirements, we strongly recommend strengthening the capi-
talisation of the euro-area banks further. Increasing capital can be done through a combina-
tion of retained earnings and rights issues.
A final point for the euro-area banks is the fiscal backstop, which is important for financial 
stability and for geopolitical reasons. The ECB is already responsible for the prudential super-
vision of the large banks in the euro area. Financial stability requires further strengthening 
of the euro area’s unfinished banking union to generate the desired incentives for banks and 
national authorities. Further risk sharing (through the European Stability Mechanism) should 
go hand-in-hand with additional harmonisation and the limitation of banks’ holdings of 
individual countries’ sovereign bonds. A completed banking union would bring the euro-area 
banks to par with their Chinese and US counterparts, which have a central system of supervi-
sion and crisis management behind them.
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1. Introduction
Reading reports on the end of global banking reminds one of Mark Twain, who famously 
wrote more than a century ago: “The report of my death was an exaggeration” (as reported by 
Marshall White, 1897). The purpose of this paper is to review what has happened to the global 
banks, which still seem to be alive.
The large global banks were at the heart of the global financial crisis. In response to the 
crisis, the international Financial Stability Forum was upgraded to the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB) in 2009, with the full participation of finance ministers and even heads of govern-
ment. The newly established FSB then published an integrated set of policy measures, such 
as capital surcharges and resolution plans, to address the systemic and moral hazard risks 
associated with global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).
Eight years later, it is time to take stock of the impact of these measures. We answer three 
questions on what happened to the G-SIBs. First, have they shrunk in size? Second, are they 
better capitalised? Third, and in reference to the reported end of global banking, have they 
reduced their global reach? A review of the resolution plans of the G-SIBs is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Some jurisdictions have only recently started to implement these plans. More-
over, the resolution plans, with the notable exception of those of the US authorities, are made 
behind a wall of secrecy, which hinders academic scrutiny.
On the important issue of capitalisation, we find that the strengthening of the Basel capital 
framework combined with capital surcharges for the G-SIBs has led to a substantial rise in 
capital levels. The leverage ratio, defined as Tier 1 capital divided by total assets, increased 
from 3.1 percent to 5.9 percent on average for the G-SIBs between 2007 and 2015. However, 
we find an uneven distribution of the higher leverage ratios. The euro area, Japan, Sweden 
and Switzerland trail behind with ratios between 4 and 5 percent each in 2015.
Using BIS International Banking Statistics, Claessens (2017) reported that cross-border 
banking has fallen by some 20 percent from its all-time high in early 2008 because of the 
global financial crisis and the subsequent euro-area crisis. But Claessens (2017) also noted 
that global banking was rising fast ahead of the global financial crisis; we are now back at the 
end-2006 level of cross-border banking. Using bottom-up data from the G-SIBs, which form 
about half of the total banking system, we find that the foreign share of these G-SIBs’ total 
assets dropped from 44 percent in 2007 to 35 percent in 2015, also a 20 percent decline. Fur-
ther analysis reveals a strong composition effect: a shift of business from the global European 
banks to the more domestic Asian banks. The US banks retain their strong position. So, the 
decline in cross-border banking is more a result of a reshuffle of the global banking champi-
ons’ league, than of the reduced global reach of individual banks.
Claessens and Van Horen (2014) indicated that the rise in foreign bank entry was spurred 
by reforms in various countries, including the opening up of eastern Europe and the liberal-
isation of entry by Latin American and East Asian countries. Moreover, it also reflected the 
sharp increase in general financial globalisation before the global financial crisis. Schoen-
maker and Wagner (2013) reported an overexposure of western European banks to the United 
States prior to the global financial crisis.
On the post-crisis decline, government intervention plays a role. Rose and Wieladek 
(2014) showed that foreign banks reduced their fraction of UK loans, while nationalised 
domestic banks kept their loan mix in the United Kingdom. Kleymenova et al (2016) reported 
that US banks on entry into the Troubled Asset Relief Programme (TARP) reduced their 
foreign lending but not their domestic lending. By contrast, De Haas et al (2015) showed that 
in general both domestic and foreign banks sharply curtailed credit in eastern Europe during 
the crisis, but that foreign banks that participated in the Vienna Initiative were relatively 
stable lenders.
Following the global financial crisis and in the wake of regulatory reform, McCauley, 
McGuire and Von Peter (2012) expected that the trend toward decentralised multinational 
banking would likely accelerate, particularly if liquidity requirements were to be applied 
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by host regulators on a legal entity basis. This is part of a broader trend of moving resources 
within banking groups becoming more restricted after the crisis (see Cerutti and Claessens, 
2007, and Schoenmaker, 2016, on ringfencing). Claessens (2017) argued that banking has 
become more regional. However, we find that both the regional and global shares of interna-
tional banking have declined evenly.
While many general factors, such as government intervention, regulatory reform and 
reduced host-country attractiveness, have been investigated, we present new evidence on 
home-country related factors. In particular, we argue that the credibility (or lack of it) of the 
fiscal backstop for large banks can partly explain the reduction in foreign presence (Schoen-
maker, 2016). We present data that the UK and Swiss banks have declined both in size and 
foreign reach. Banks from the European banking union are in the twilight zone: they have 
reduced in size, albeit to a lesser degree than the UK and Swiss banks, but have kept their 
geographic spread. The reduction in size was predicted because Europe is overbanked and 
needs to make a transition towards a healthier mix of bank and market financing (Langfield 
and Pagano, 2016).
2. Data on global banks
To get a rich picture of global banking, we take a bottom-up approach to the collection of data 
on the foreign reach of G-SIBs. The methodology to assess the global systemic importance of 
banks is based on five indicators: size, global activity, interconnectedness, substitutability of 
services and complexity (see Schoenmaker, 2013, for a review). Because of their global activi-
ty, this group of G-SIBs is the most relevant for research on global banking.
The FSB’s original list of G-SIBs of 2011 is updated annually. To avoid survivor bias, we 
include in our sample all G-SIBs, 30 from the 2016 list and three (BBVA, Commerzbank and 
Lloyds Bank) from earlier years (FSB, 2016). Table 1 shows that the G-SIBs account for about 
half of the total banking assets in the major banking countries, with the euro area treated as a 
single country area because of the introduction of the European banking union with central-
ised supervision of the large banks. 
Table 1: Share of G-SIBs in total banking assets (in $ billion; 2015)
Country Total banking assets Assets of G-SIBs G-SIBs’ share
China 30,730  11,577 38%
Euro area 30,208  13,192 44%
Japan 9,415  6,086 65%
United Kingdom 10,179  7,092 70%
United States 15,564  10,303 66%
Total 96,095  48,249 50%
Source: Total assets from Schoenmaker and Véron (2016); G-SIBs from Table 2. Notes: This table contains the major banking economies. 
The first column is total banking assets in a country. The second column contains the total bank assets of the G-SIBs in a country. These 
five countries contain 30 of the 33 G-SIBs in our sample.
To assess the extent of the retreat in global banking, we compare the current make-up of 
the G-SIBs with that at the end of 2007, just before the global financial crisis arrived. We look 
at three aspects: size, capital and geographical spread. Size is straightforwardly measured 
by total assets. For capital, we examine the leverage ratio, which is a simple and undistorted 
measure of capitalisation. A bank’s leverage ratio is defined as a bank’s Tier 1 capital divided 
by its total assets. While Basel has harmonised the definition of Tier 1 capital, the US Gener-
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ally Accepted Accounting Principles allow netting, which reduces the total assets of US banks. 
Our data source, SNL, restates the total assets of US banks and of Credit Suisse (based on US 
GAAP) to IFRS estimates. We use these IFRS estimates in order to make the leverage ratios 
comparable (Table 2). For the geographic spread, we take from the respective annual reports 
of the G-SIBs the segmentation of assets over the home country, the rest of the region and the 
rest of the world (see Duijm and Schoenmaker, 2017, for a full explanation of the methodol-
ogy). The leverage ratio and geographical segmentation for a group of banks are calculated as 
a weighted average, with total assets as weights.
To compare the changes over the 2007-15 period, we calculate the percentage change in 
total assets and the change in percentage points of the leverage ratio and geographic shares. 
The percentage points for the geographic shares add up to zero. Table 3 presents our data.
Table 2: Computed leverage ratio based on IFRS assets (2015)
Banking groups Tier 1 
Capital
Original 
assets
Self-
reported 
leverage 
ratio
IFRS 
assets
Computed 
leverage 
ratio
1 BBVA 53 815 6.0% 815 6.5%
2 BNP Paribas 83 2,166 4.0% 2,166 3.9%
3 Commerzbank 30 579 4.5% 579 5.1%
4 Deutsche Bank 63 1,769 3.5% 1,769 3.6%
5 Groupe BPCE 57 1,267 4.9% 1,267 4.5%
6 Groupe Crédit 
Agricole
85 1,845 5.7% 1,845 4.6%
7 ING Bank 44 911 4.1% 911 4.8%
8 Santander 80 1,456 4.7% 1,456 5.5%
9 Société Générale 54 1,449 3.8% 1,449 3.7%
10 UniCredit Group 49 935 4.4% 935 5.2%
Total euro area 598 13,192 4.5% 13,192 4.5%
1 Bank of America 181 2,144 6.4% 2,784 6.5%
2 Bank of New York 
Mellon
21 394 4.9% 405 5.2%
3 Citigroup 176 1,731 7.1% 2,299 7.7%
4 Goldman Sachs 82 861 5.9% 1,582 5.2%
5 JP Morgan Chase 200 2,352 6.5% 3,254 6.2%
6 Morgan Stanley 67 787 5.8% 1,230 5.4%
7 State Street 15 245 5.8% 252 6.0%
8 Wells Fargo 165 1,788 7.7% 1,855 8.9%
Total United States 907 10,303 6.6% 13,661 6.6%
1 Agricultural Bank 
of China
186 2,740 6.3% 2,740 6.8%
2 Bank of China 198 2,590 7.0% 2,590 7.6%
3 China Construction 
Bank
220 2,826 7.3% 2,826 7.8%
4 Industrial and 
Commercial Bank 
of China
274 3,421 7.5% 3,421 8.0%
Total China 878 11,577 7.1% 11,577 7.6%
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Table 2 continued
1 Barclays 78 1,651 4.5% 1,651 4.7%
2 HSBC 153 2,410 5.0% 2,410 6.4%
3 Lloyds Banking 
Group
54 1,189 4.8% 1,189 4.5%
4 Royal Bank of 
Scotland
68 1,202 5.6% 1,202 5.7%
5 Standard Chartered 43 640 5.5% 640 6.7%
Total UK 396 7,092 5.0% 7,092 5.6%
1 Mitsubishi UFJ FG 132 2,602 4.8% 2,621 5.0%
2 Mizuho FG 77 1,883 4.0% 1,883 4.1%
3 Sumitomo Mitsui FG 80 1,600 4.6% 1,616 5.0%
Total Japan 289 6,086 4.5% 6,120 4.7%
1 Credit Suisse 53 827 4.5% 1,098 4.9%
2 UBS 45 942 4.0% 942 4.7%
Total Switzerland 98 1,769 4.2% 2,040 4.8%
1 Nordea 29 703 4.6% 703 4.1%
Total Sweden 29 703 4.6% 703 4.1%
33 Total 3,194 50,720 5.6% 54,383 5.9%
Source: Bruegel (see Table 3). Notes: The first column contains the number of G-SIBs – 30 from 2016 and 3 from earlier years. Tier 1 
capital and assets are in US$ billions. The second column provides Tier 1 capital. The third column reports the original assets (US GAAP or 
IFRS). The fourth column gives the self-reported leverage ratio of banks. To make the leverage ratio comparable across regions, they are 
calculated on an IFRS assets basis (no netting). The computed leverage ratio in column 6 is calculated on the basis of the IFRS assets: Tier 
1 Capital / total IFRS assets.
Table 3: Changes in size, capital and geographical spread of G-SIBs (2007-2015)
- 2007 -
No. G-SIBs Region Total assets Capital Home Region World
10 Euro area 16,213 2.70% 48% 28% 24%
8 United States 9,329 3.90% 71% 6% 23%
4 China 3,639 6.00% 92% 4% 3%
5
United 
Kingdom
10,823 2.70% 49% 17% 34%
3 Japan 4,344 3.70% 72% 5% 23%
2 Switzerland 3,211 1.70% 23% 29% 48%
1 Sweden 569 3.70% 35% 65% 0%
33 Total 48,128 3.10% 56% 18% 26%
    - 2015 -
  Region Total assets Capital Home Region World
10 Euro area 13,192 4.50% 49% 30% 22%
8 United States 10,303 6.60% 75% 3% 22%
4 China 11,577 7.60% 90% 6% 4%
5
United 
Kingdom
7,092 5.60% 53% 9% 38%
3 Japan 6,086 4.70% 65% 9% 27%
2 Switzerland 1,769 4.80% 30% 22% 48%
1 Sweden 703 4.10% 28% 69% 3%
33 Total 50,720 5.90% 65% 14% 21%
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Table 3 continued
    Change 2007-15
  Region Total assets Capital Home Region World
10 Euro area -19% 1.80% 1% 1% -2%
8 United States 10% 2.70% 5% -3% -2%
4 China 218% 1.60% -3% 2% 1%
5
United 
Kingdom
-34% 2.90% 4% -8% 4%
3 Japan 40% 1.00% -8% 4% 4%
2 Switzerland -45% 3.10% 7% -7% 0%
1 Sweden 23% 0.40% -7% 4% 3%
33 Total 5% 2.70% 9% -4% -5%
Source: Assets and capital from SNL, 10-K Reports, Annual Reports; Geographic spread for European banks from Duijm and Schoenmaker 
(2017) and for US and Asian banks updated from Schoenmaker (2013). Notes: The first column contains the number of G-SIBs – 30 from 
2016 and 3 from earlier years. Total assets are in US$ billions and sum the total assets of the G-SIBs in the respective region or country. 
Capital is measured as the leverage ratio (Tier 1 equity / total assets). To make the leverage ratio comparable across regions, they are 
calculated on an IFRS basis (no netting); see Table 2 for individual banks. The geographical segmentation of assets covers the home 
country, the rest of the region or continent (Americas, Europe and Asia) and the rest of the world. The leverage ratio and geographical 
spread are calculated as a weighted average of the G-SIBS in the respective region or country. The change in total assets is calculated as 
a percentage; the change in capital (leverage ratio) is in percentage points; changes in the geographical weights (of home, region and 
world) are in percentage points and thus add up to zero.
The overall trend indicates no retreat of global banks themselves, with a small pick-up of 5 
percent in total assets between 2007 and 2015. Although this percentage is much lower than 
the compounded economic growth of world GDP at 28 percent over these years (Schoen-
maker, 2016), there is no decline in global banks. Next, we find a substantial increase in 
capitalisation from 3.1 to 5.9 percent. Policymakers have thus been successful in increasing 
the capital level in the banking sector.
Looking at the geographical spread, we note a retreat in global banking (defined as foreign 
assets in the rest of the region and in the rest of the world) from 44 percent in 2007 to 35 percent 
in 2015. This 20 percent decline is in line with other reports on global banking (eg Claessens, 
2017). It should be noted that the decline is evenly shared between the regional share (from 
18 to 14 percent) and the global share (from 26 to 21 percent). Unlike other studies (Claessens, 
2017; Claessens and Van Horen, 2014), we do not observe an increase in regional banking at 
the expense of global banking. The next section discusses the country-specific details.
3. Country patterns in global banking
While most research on global banking is done from a host-country perspective (eg De Haas 
et al, 2015; Rose and Wieladek, 2014), we take a home-country perspective. Can we explain 
differences in global reach by the home country of these global banks? The G-SIBs are located 
in the world’s major economies. Only six countries – China, the euro area, Japan, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States – are home to two or more large G-SIBs, and Swe-
den has one G-SIB. We look at three aspects: size, capital and cross-border banking.
3.1 Size of banks
On size, a clear country pattern emerges. The Asian countries, China and Japan, were not 
directly hit by the global financial crisis and their banks kept on growing between 2007 and 
2015, with an increase in total assets of 218 and 40 percent respectively (see the bottom panel 
of Table 3). After the swift recapitalisation of the US banks in March 2009, the US banks, and 
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the US economy, resumed growth. By contrast, the picture in Europe is one of decline, with a 
strong drop in the UK (-34 percent) and Switzerland (-45 percent). The decline in euro-area 
banking is intermediate at -19 percent.
The decline in Europe can be explained by three factors. The first is structural: Europe 
is overbanked, with 80 percent of credit provided by banks and only 20 percent by mar-
kets (Langfield and Pagano, 2016). Europe is thus in a transition from bank-based to more 
market-based financing. This is a good development, as a healthy mix of bank and market 
financing diversifies the funding sources of corporates.
The second factor is crisis related. European banks were particularly hard hit by the global 
financial crisis that originated in the US, because of their overexposure to the US (Schoen-
maker and Wagner, 2013). Next, the euro sovereign crisis hit the European economies and 
banks again. Related to this ‘double hit’ were the slow and unconvincing attempts to recap-
italise European banks. While the US Treasury published the capital shortfall (if any) of US 
banks in dollar amounts, which the respective banks had to cover with fresh capital after the 
March 2009 stress test, the European Banking Authority defined a target capital ratio (capital 
divided by risk weighted assets), despite several warnings from academics (eg Acharya et al, 
2011). European banks with a shortfall were allowed to meet the target capital ratio either by 
fresh capital and/or downsizing assets. This triggered a process of deleveraging.
The third factor is policy related. The UK and Switzerland have enacted major reforms 
(structural reforms and higher capital charges) with the official aim of increasing the resil-
ience of their banking systems, and the intended side effect of downsizing their large banks 
and reducing their foreign activities at the same time (Schoenmaker, 2016). The new require-
ments have been disproportionally stringent on the largest banks compared to the rest of 
the banking system. The Vickers separation of retail and wholesale banking, which affects 
the large UK banks, is a case in point. The main purpose of this separation is to limit the 
contingent liability of the UK taxpayer for providing support to the British banking system 
(Goodhart, 2012). Moreover, the UK and Switzerland have imposed higher capital surcharges 
than other countries on their large banks. In contrast, the major euro-area countries have 
implemented some lighter ‘Liikanen’ reforms (Liikanen, 2012).
3.2 Bank capital
On capital, we report an almost doubling of the average leverage ratio from 3.1 to 5.9 percent. 
Looking at the change between 2007 and 2015, Switzerland, the UK and the US have imple-
mented the highest increases of 3.1, 2.9 and 2.7 percentage points respectively (the bottom 
panel of Table 3 reports the changes). On current capital levels, China and the US are leading 
with leverage ratios for their G-SIBs of 7.6 and 6.6 percent respectively, followed by the UK 
with 5.6 percent. The other European countries and Japan are trailing behind with ratios of 
between 4 and 5 percent. The banks from the latter countries are operating close to the bare 
minimum of 3.5 percent, which is the sum of the Basel leverage ratio of 3 percent and the 
average G-SIB surcharge of 0.5 percent of total assets1. Figure 1 on the next page shows the 
current capital levels of the G-SIBs in the various countries.
To analyse the increase in capital in more detail, we split the 2.7 percentage points 
increase into an increase arising from changes in capital at individual banks and an increase 
from changes in the size (measured by assets) of individual banks. The latter is the composi-
tion effect measuring the relative weight of individual G-SIBs in the overall G-SIB population. 
Table 4 reports that 78 percent of the 2.7 percentage points increase is due to changes in 
capital at individual G-SIBs, which confirms the overall increase in capital because of Basel 
3. Only 22 percent of the increase comes from changes in the size of individual G-SIBs, which 
1 The average G-SIB surcharge is 1.33 percent of risk-weighted assets. This is calculated as the weighted average of 
surcharges ranging from 1 to 2.5 percent; weighted by the number of banks in each bucket (FSB, 2016). Berger et al 
(2016) find that the risk-weighted assets are about 34 percent of total assets for G-SIBs. The leverage ratio equiva-
lent (based on total assets) is then 0.45 percent (= 34 percent * 1.33 percent).
After recapitalisation, 
the US banks, and US 
economy, resumed 
growth. By contrast, 
the picture in Europe 
is one of decline
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measures their relative contribution to the group of G-SIBs.
Figure 1: Capital of G-SIBs, selected countries (as % of total assets; 2015)
Source: Bruegel (see Table 2). Notes: Capital is measured as the leverage ratio (Tier 1 equity/total assets). To make the leverage ratio 
comparable across regions, they are calculated on an IFRS basis (no netting).
Table 4: Change in capital of G-SIBs (2007-2015)
Changes (in percentage points) Share in overall change (in %)
Changes in capital 2.3% 78%
Changes in bank size 0.6% 22%
Combined effect -0.2%
Overall change 2007-15 2.7%
Source: Bruegel (see Table 3). Notes: The overall change in capital from 2007 to 2015 (bottom row) is split into a part arising from changes 
in the capital of individual G-SIBs and a part arising from changes in the size of individual G-SIBs, which measures their relative share in 
the total group of G-SIBs (the composition effect). The third row is the combined effect of capital and weight changes. 
While good progress has been made on average with higher capital charges, Europe and 
Japan are behind in the pack. We recommend that they converge towards the international 
practice of well-capitalised banks with leverage ratios of 5.5 to 6 percent. However, the negoti-
ation stance of the European Commission, and of some major European regulators, is that the 
new Basel IV package should not lead to extra capital requirements in total for the European 
banking sector, for fear it would result in reduced lending (Financial Times, 2016). The banks 
convinced the European Commission that higher capital charges would lead to a reduction 
in lending. But is that true? Looking at the impact of higher Basel II capital requirements 
for trade finance in 2012, Demir et al, (2016) found that the effect on international trade of 
a shock to the supply of trade finance is more subtle than suggested in the popular press, 
inferred from banking surveys or typically assumed in the trade finance literature. While 
risk-weight changes brought about by Basel II affect trade shares, the overall trade growth was 
unaffected.
More generally, US evidence also suggests that higher capital requirements do not neces-
sarily lead to less lending. The US banks resumed business after a swift and decisive recapital-
isation in March 2009, supporting economic growth in the US. By contrast, Gambacorta and 
Marques-Ibanez (2011) show that banks with weaker core capital positions restricted the loan 
supply more strongly during the 2007-10 crisis period.
How can European and Japanese banks raise capital in difficult times? Acharya, Schoen-
maker and Steffen (2011) argue that banks could raise capital on the market through deeply 
discounted rights issues. Current shareholders would have the right to buy the newly issued 
shares. They would have an incentive to do so because the new shares are under-priced 
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(deeply discounted). If they do not have the necessary cash, current shareholders can sell the 
new shares. Recent examples are UniCredit, which raised €13 billion in fresh capital through 
a rights issue in early 20172, and Deutsche Bank, which announced a rights issue in March 
2017. Another source of capital is retained earnings, which banks can increase by reducing 
dividends.
3.3 Cross-border banking
On cross-border banking, the country picture is slightly different from that on size. Again, 
the Asian banks show an increase in globalisation, with an uptick in foreign activities of 3 
percentage points for Chinese banks and 8 percentage points for Japanese banks (see the bot-
tom panel of Table 3). By contrast, US banks have experienced a reduction in foreign activity, 
which can be partly explained by the stronger performance of the US economy than the EU 
economy (the major receiver of international US banking services). This stronger economic 
performance in the US created more business opportunities at home for the US banks.
For the European banks, the geographic picture is similar to that on size. The UK and 
Swiss banks show a strong decline in foreign banking (- 4 and -7 percentage points), with the 
decline concentrated in regional banking. So the UK and Swiss banks reduced their activities 
in Europe, but not at the global level. For the euro-area banks the picture is almost flat. Table 
3 indicates a slight uptick of domestic and European activities (both 1 percentage point) and a 
similar decline in global business of -2 percentage points. The euro-area banks are thus main-
taining a strong geographic footprint with 30 percent of their business in Europe (outside 
their home country) and 22 percent in the rest of the world.
While the country patterns are balanced (apart from the fact that both the UK and Switzer-
land are declining), the overall picture is more pronounced. The total foreign share of global 
banks (all G-SIBs) fell from 44 percent in 2007 to 35 percent in 2015. This decline of 9 percent-
age points reflects a 20 percent decline in global banking, which is in line with other research 
findings. Claessens (2017), for example, also reports a 20 percent decline in global banking.
What are the underlying causes of this large decline? To answer this question, we split 
the 9 percentage points decline (which is a weighted average for the group of banks) into a 
decline caused by changes in the geographical spread at individual banks and a decline aris-
ing from changes in the relative shares of individual banks in the group of banks (the compo-
sition effect). Table 5 reports that only 16 percent is due to changes in the geographic spread 
at individual G-SIBs, which is in line with the moderate effects that we find at the country 
level. G-SIBs are like large oil tankers – they find it difficult to change course. It only happens 
after a major event. The largest part of the decline (84 percent) comes thus from changes in 
the size of individual G-SIBs, which measures their relative contribution to the group.
Table 3 reports the growth of Chinese banks, and to a lesser extent that of Japanese and 
US banks. These banks are less international than the European banks, which have shrunk 
since the crisis. As a result, the amount of cross-border activity in percent of total size of all 
the banks’ balance sheets has decreased. So the vast part of the decline of global banking is 
a result of the rise of the more domestically-oriented Chinese banks and the decline of the 
more global European banks.
2 See the press release ‘UniCredit: rights issue fully subscribed’, UniCredit, 2 March 2017.
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Table 5: Change in cross-border banking of G-SIBs (2007-2015)
Changes (in percentage points) Share in overall change (in %)
Changes in geographical 
spread -1.6% 16%
Changes in bank size -8.3% 84%
Combined effect 1.2%
Overall change 2007-15 -8.7%
Source: Bruegel (see Table 3). Notes: The overall change in cross-border banking from 2007 to 2015 (bottom row) is split into a part arising from 
changes in the geographical spread of individual G-SIBs and a part arising from changes in the size of individual G-SIBs which measures their 
relative share in the total group of G-SIBs (the composition effect). The third row is the combined effect of spread and bank share changes.
4. Policy implications and conclusions
We conclude that reports on the death of global banking are greatly exaggerated. The exces-
sive increase in cross-border banking in the run up to the global financial crisis has been 
reversed. We have returned to the 2006 level of globalisation, and that has remained flat over 
the last few years. In particular, we find that the regional and global shares of cross-border 
banking both declined by 20 percent between 2007 and 2015.
Interestingly, the reduction in cross-border banking is only partly a result of the declin-
ing foreign shares of individual banks. A major part (84 percent) of the 20 percent decline 
in cross-border banking can be explained by the composition effect: changes in the ranking 
within the G-SIBs champions’ league. The large Chinese banks with very limited cross-bor-
der banking have risen spectacularly (more than 200 percent from 2007-15), while the global 
UK and Swiss banks have witnessed a substantial drop of about 40 percent. In response to 
the crisis, the UK and Swiss authorities have implemented structural reforms with the aim 
of improving the resilience of their large banks and of reducing the size and foreign reach of 
these banks (Schoenmaker, 2016).
An important policy measure is the increase in capital at G-SIBs. Overall, we find an 
almost doubling of the leverage ratio from 3.1 percent in 2007 to 5.9 percent in 2015. This 
is very welcome. However, we note that the euro area, Japan, Sweden and Switzerland trail 
behind with leverage ratios between 4 and 5 percent. We recommend that these countries 
should bring the leverage ratios of their largest banks more into line with international 
practice.
The euro-area banks are in the twilight zone. These banks have reduced in size (about 20 
percent), which was to be expected because of overbanking in Europe (Langfield and Pagano, 
2016), but have retained their geographical reach. However, the capitalisation of euro-area 
banks lags that of their Chinese and US peers. While the European Central Bank has already 
made progress on the size and consistency of Pillar 2 capital requirements (Schoenmaker and 
Véron, 2016), we strongly recommend reinforcing the capitalisation of the euro-area banks 
further. Increasing capital can be done through a combination of retained earnings and rights 
issues.
A final point for the euro-area banks is the fiscal backstop, which is important for finan-
cial stability and geopolitical reasons (Schoenmaker, 2016). The ECB is already responsible 
for the prudential supervision of the G-SIBs in the euro area. Financial stability requires 
further strengthening of the euro-area’s unfinished banking union to generate the desired 
incentives for banks and national authorities. Further risk sharing (through the European 
Stability Mechanism) should go hand-in-hand with additional harmonisation initiatives and 
the limitation of banks’ holdings of individual countries’ sovereign bonds (Sapir et al, 2017). 
A completed banking union would bring the euro-area banks to par with the Chinese and US 
banks, which have a central system of supervision and crisis management behind them.
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